SORA - PQC

SORA - PQC

Shor's Algorithm for Quantum Computation

Until now, it was believed that Shor's algorithm would not be practically applicable to the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) that forms the cryptographic keys (private/public keys) of cryptocurrencies until after 2030.

However, in 2025, news broke that - although on a minimal scale of just 5 bits - the reverse computation against an elliptic curve had succeeded (calculating the [private key: scalar multiple from the base point] from the [public key: coordinate data]). In other words, ECC had actually been broken. Moreover, the computation was performed using only 133 quantum bits (publicly available for general use).

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) to Prevent Shor's Reverse Computation

The threat posed by Shor's algorithm can be countered with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). To defend against reverse computation attacks by Shor, there is now an urgent need to integrate PQC into cryptocurrency systems.

SORA Chooses PQC Over SegWit

The SORA Project has prioritized quantum resistance over SegWit, assigning PQC to addresses starting with "sora1". Currently, this PQC is live on the mainnet, and simply using a "sora1" address allows users to benefit from quantum resistance.

Separate Management of ECDSA and PQC Balances

For compatibility, the traditional ECDSA can still be used. However, given the current situation, discontinuing ECDSA is under consideration depending on the pace of quantum computing development. Therefore, balances are displayed separately for ECDSA and PQC. In the lower section of the interface (highlighted with red circles), the upper field shows the ECDSA balance, and the lower field shows the quantum-resistant balance.

Quantum Algorithms That PQC Cannot Defend Against - The Threat of Grover's Algorithm

Shor's algorithm is not the only quantum threat. Grover's algorithm, a quantum search method, poses a risk to cryptographic hash functions through high-speed searches using a quantum oracle. Against Grover's algorithm, PQC is ineffective. In other words, no matter what PQC is implemented, it can still be compromised by Grover's algorithm.

Therefore, SORA is developing not only PQC as a countermeasure against Shor, but also quantum resistance against Grover, in order to strengthen cryptographic defense in the quantum era.

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